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21 September 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : PFIAB Recommendations on Soviet
Deception

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1. The 4 September Foster/Weiss memo to you (Attachment 1) makes recommendations for Community actions on possible Soviet deception which surfaced at the Airlie Conference. These recommendations are consistent with the views they expressed at the conference. (Attachment 2 is our summary of their general concerns and their other recommendations made at Airlie.)

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2. FICG has a comprehensive memo in preparation which explores a whole range of follow-up implications of the conference. Thus, I prefer a somewhat measured response to PFIAB until we've had a chance to more fully digest the whole package of conference implications. Any Foster/Weiss recommendations ought to be considered as part--albeit an important part--of our more broad-based approach to these deception issues.

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3. As a preliminary response, however, I think their three basic recommendations all have merit, and deserve our consideration for follow-up studies. Let me take each in turn.

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5. Deception in arms control talks is an important issue and a potentially lucrative research area. As defined in the Foster/Weiss memo, however, it appears too generalized to be practicable. Since it would be a major labor-intensive project, we should begin with a much clearer picture of what to look for. Perhaps Foster and Weiss can better focus their concerns by helping us formulate some testable hypotheses against which we can compare the written record. Then we will be in a better position to judge whether such a project would be worthwhile.

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6. Such a study would be complementary to, and should be done in conjunction with, a related study requested by [redacted] to review the arms control record for knowledge gained about Soviet forces. While these should be separate undertakings, it makes sense to have the deception analysts closely attuned to intelligence we might have gained solely from arms control negotiations.

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7. Soviet disinformation in the public arena emerged as one of the major issues discussed at the conference. Your 10 September talking points for PFIAB, which you may not have had time to review, did address our concerns here (Attachment 3, page 3, last paragraph), and we envision a concerted response to this problem. In part, this is less of a problem than they suggest owing to the State-chaired Active Measures Working Group which has been very active in this arena. This interagency effort was

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The answer is not much. I will be recommending this very expensive & unproductive (we already know the answer).

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set up to keep the USG abreast of Soviet active measures, and to help State better respond to them in a timely and coordinated fashion. DO represents CIA at their bi-weekly meetings, and FICG, OGI, and SOVA also attend.

But the problem we should address is how to better focus the intelligence analysis effort (as distinct from diplomatic or C.A. countermeasures) against Soviet influence operations--to include, but not be limited to, active measures--against Western and US targets. Of course this is broader than a "deception" problem (at least as defined by many inside the Community), and I am, with FICG, now exploring ways to improve our management of this issue.

8. If you agree, we will prepare your response to PFIAB along these lines.

Robert M. Gates

Attachments:

- 1 - PFIAB Memo to DCI, 4 Sept 84
- 2 - FICG Memo to [redacted], 11 Sept 84
- 3 - DCI Talking Points for PFIAB 10 Sept 84

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